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INTRODUCTION

Perhaps paradoxically, "franchise" signals both a privilege and a
right. Thus "franchise" means "freedom or immunity from some burden
or restriction" and "a special privilege."' "Franchise" also means the
basic constitutional or statutory right to vote as well as the right to
exercise the powers of a corporation. The tension between voting as
a basic right of participation and voting as a special privilege is resolved
only by the circular idea that potential voters have a right to vote
within settings in which they have a voting membership. In the public
settings of government elections and in the private settings of corporate governance, the basic governance question is, who should vote?
Of course, this question prompts other questions: Who should vote on
what matter? In what setting? Alongside what other voters and according to what rules of voting?

*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; J.D., Yale Law School, 1979.
**General Counsel, Institutional Shareholder Services; J.D., University of Chicago School
of Law, 1977. We thank Reinier Kraakman, Robert A.G. Monks, and David B. Apatoff for their
comments.
1.

WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 489 (1988). 'Franchise" also refers

to the privilege of using the products and merchandizing developed by someone else. We may
use "franchise" metaphorically in this article as we discuss analogies between political voting
and voting in the corporate shareholder context.
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Professor Frank Michelman provides an intriguing analysis of judicial treatment of selective enfranchisement rules justified on the basis
of interest, residence, and competence. 2 Michelman illuminates judicial
disagreements over these rules by relating them to two contrasting
notions of the purposes of political participation. As one conception of
politics, he links debates over enfranchisement to instrumental
achievement of prepolitical ends. As the second conception of politics,
he links those debates to a cooperative deliberation aimed at developing shared purposes. 3 He distinguishes two values given to participation - instrumental and constitutive - and two styles for participation
strategic and deliberative. 4 Professor Michelman also shows the
possibility of complex interactions between these contrasting values
and contrasting styles. 5
His analysis prompts us to consider the interaction between the
instrumental and constitutive values, and between strategic and deliberative styles, in debates over enfranchisement in two contexts
beyond the scope of his article: shareholder voting within corporate
decisionmaking and women's voting prior to the adoption of the
nineteenth amendment in 1920. In these two contexts, arguments
about who can vote reveal complex interrelationships between instrumental and deliberative politics, suggest additional paradoxes about
enfranchisement, and illuminate collective struggles to govern diverse
people and interests. The discussion that follows thus suggests that
debates over the values and methods of political participation can
provide tools for a deeper understanding of particular institutional and
historical settings.
II.

SHAREHOLDERS AND VOTING

In contemporary society, private decisions made by corporations
affect everyday life as much as public decisions made by governmental
bodies. As two commentators noted not long ago, "By making ordinary
business decisions [corporate] managers now have more power than
most sovereign governments to determine where people will live; what
work they will do if any; what they will eat, drink, and wear; what
sorts of knowledge, schools, and universities they will encourage; and

2. See Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American ConstitutionalArgument: Voting
Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989) [hereinafter Michelman, Voting Rights].
3. Id. at 445-47.
4. Id. at 447-52.
5. Id. at 451-52.
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what kinds of society their children will inherit. '6 Who should participate in these decisions?
Just as the system for representative democracy sought to provide
a legitimate basis for public power,7 the system of corporate governance sought to provide a legitimate basis for private power. Both
are attempts to grapple with the problems that arise when increasingly
complicated issues require the full-time attention of those especially
qualified to attend to governance. Professional expertise is one kind
of special qualification; qualities of virtue represent another, more
familiar in the classic defenses of representative democracy. Both qualities are cited to justify actions by representatives on behalf of the
community, whether the community consists of citizens or shareholders. Management of day-to-day problems is too difficult and time consuming if all interested persons retain rights to participate. Thus, in
both public governmental settings and large corporate settings, day-today management decisions are delegated to designated authorities who
have the expertise and time to focus on these complicated matters.
Precisely because of the reliance on delegated authority, another concept -

agency costs -

acquires pertinence for governmental and

corporate settings. In both settings, structures to assure accountability
are necessary to guard against self-dealing by those who exercise the
community's delegated authority. Accountability is also necessary to
guard against the other agency costs of neglect, failure to pay adequate
attention to the interests supposedly represented, and honest misunderstandings of those interests or how they would best be served.
A. Why ShareholdersNeed to Vote
Perhaps the most basic structure for accountability is the ability
of a community to reject the delegates and to vote them out of office.
Yet voting has not been the central mechanism for corporate governance. Management nominated the single slate of director candidates
and counted the votes. Rather than "voicing" their disapproval, shareholders could sue through the class action device of shareholder derivative actions or exit -

"vote with their feet" -

and sell their shares.8

6. R. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH, THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 15 (1974). Many legal realists also recognized the enormous power that private
entities exercise. See, e.g., Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
7. See M. KAMMEN, SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE IN
AmERICAN CULTURE 24 (1988).
8. See Lowenstein, Beating the Wall Street Rule with a Stock and a Carrot, 1988 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 251 (explaining that shareholders often were faced with the choice of 'love'em

or leave'em.").
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Both of these alternatives have proved less than satisfactory. Shareholder derivative suits impose large costs on those who pursue them
and encounter severe impediments to collective action.9 A shareholder
pursuing a derivative suit must underwrite the costs of the suit for
only a pro rata share of the returns, if there are any.10 Moreover, this
option falls prey to the wide deference to directors' authority under
the business judgment rule, making the derivative suit virtually meaningless as a check on delegated authority.
Under the alternative, "voting with one's feet," often known as
the traditional "Wall Street Rule," shareholders should either vote
with management or sell their shares. 1 Theoretically, if enough shareholders become unhappy and sell out, management will have to change
its policies to attract new shareholders. Yet, as Edward Jay Epstein
points out:
[J]ust the exchange of one powerless shareholder for another
in a corporation, while it may lessen the market price of
shares, will not dislodge management - or even threaten
it. On the contrary, if dissident shareholders leave, it may
even bring about the further entrenchment of management
especially if management can pass new bylaws in the
interim.2
The emergence of large institutional investors creates a class of
shareholders who are just too big to sell out a company every time
they disagree with management.13 A sale of an institution's large block
of shares could depress share value and thus violate fiduciary standards. Widespread policies render the Wall Street Rule ineffectual. An
institutional investor may object to poison pills, for example, but it
cannot sell out of each of all 900 companies that have adopted them
without critical damage to the portfolio's diversity. 14 Many large in-

9.

See E.

EPSTEIN, WHO OWNS THE

CORPORATION 17-24 (1986) (generally discussing

how laws are advantageous to management and explaining how management has a virtually
impregnable shield - the business judgment rule).
10. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 377, at 1108 (1983) (often
plaintiffs are required to post security for litigation expenses).
11. As Professor Louis Lowenstein explains, the Wall Street Rule "dictates that shareholders not take an active role in corporate affairs." Lowenstein, supra note 8,at 251 (1988).
Shareholders are expected to be passive or to leave. Id.
12. E. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 24-25 (1986).
13. Such institutional shareholders may have holdings in a single, individual company of
millions of shares. This makes selling out of a company impractical and financially risky, because
a sale of that size can itself depress the market.
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stitutions are indexed, 15 and those that are not are so largeand diverse
that they might as well be. Those that are indexed cannot sell out;
they must wait and watch as poorly managed companies sink below
the cutoff line. Those that can sell out in theory find that they cannot
in practice because they cannot sell out of a company unless they have
a better place to put the money.

Perhaps at a more basic level, alternatives to voting simply have
not worked. Compare the patterns of congressional pay raises and

raises for corporate officers. Recent congressional pay raise proposals
became derailed because politicians did not want to risk being thrown
out of office. Corporate officers, however, give themselves raises resulting in salaries that multiply what were acceptable salaries only a
few years ago16 because they remain insulated from accountability to
the shareholder community. As the landmark work on security analysis
maintained over half a century ago, compensation to officers - and

similar areas of conflicting interests between officers and shareholders
should be primary topics of concern for shareholder participation
7
in corporate governance.'

14. Poison pills, or "rights plans," generally take the form of rights or warrants issued to
shareholders that are triggered by events associated with a hostile acquisition attempt, i.e., a
takeover bid or other similar transaction not approved by the target's board. When triggered,
pills give shareholders the ability to purchase shares from or sell shares back to the target
company or the potential acquirer at a price far out of line with their fair market value.
Depending on the type of pill,
the triggering event can either transfer a huge amount of wealth
out of the target company or dilute the equity holdings of the potential acquirer's pre-existing
shareholders. The most common current form of pill,
the "flip-over" plan, gives target shareholders the right to purchase shares of the potential acquirer's common stock at a steep discount
from market value - usually 50% - should the acquirer attempt a second-stage merger not
approved by the target's board. The right is discriminatory in that the potential acquirer cannot
participate. Because the built-in discount would encourage all of the target shareholders to
exercise their rights and purchase shares from the acquirer, and because the potential acquirer's
shareholders would be precluded from participating, the result would be that the acquirer's
pre-existing shareholders would find their own equity interests substantially diluted. This is the
"poison" in the flip-over plan. See M. Ryngaert & G. Jarrell, The Effects of Poison Pills on the
Wealth of Target Shareholders Securities and Exchange Commission 43 (Oct. 15, 1986) (Office
of the Chief Economist, available through Institutional Shareholder Services).
15. Woodlock, Index Funds, in PENSION FUND INVESTMENT 101-11 (1987). An index is
a type of "passive portfolio" that tracks an index. Id. at 101. An example is the Standard &
Poors Index. Investment managers do not make buy-sell decisions based on analysis of individual
companies, but hold the stock as long as it is in the index.
16. See generally Who Gets the Most Pay, FORBES, May 29, 1989, at 192.
17. B. GRAHAm & D. DODD, SECURITIES ANALYSIS 510-11 (1st ed. 1934). This text also
suggests other areas for shareholder involvement in governance, given the agenda of monitoring
conflicts of interests. Thus, the authors identify decisions about expansion of the business,
payment of dividends, and continuance of the stockholders' investment in the company as appro-
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Similarly, voting is the sole mechanism by which shareholders may
respond to anti-takeover measures that protect management. Most
defensive takeover actions require shareholder approval through proxy
voting (although poison pills are a significant exception). State antitakeover laws 18 have made proxies, rather than tender offers, the
arena of choice in the battle for corporate control. Although in the
past shareholders received proxies asking for approval of merely an
unopposed slate of directors and a "Big Eight" accounting firm, today
management and shareholders propose a dizzying array of proposals
for proxy votes. Proposals for classified boards, cumulative voting,
confidential voting, elimination of the right to act by written consent,
reincorporation in another state, issuance of blank check preferred
stock, preemptive rights, limitation of liability, and the right to consider the interests of "stakeholders" in selecting a course of action are
just a few examples of what a proxy may contain. 19 These proposals
can affect the value of shares. Voting proxies once may have been a
meaningless nuisance, but today they are an investment decision with
economic consequences.
For these reasons, voting has become the central mechanism for
corporate governance. Voting guards against the self-dealing of managers and directors. The question about who should vote still remains.
An analysis of this question should consider instrumental and deliberative values in voting, but those concepts remain intertwined and do
not seem to provide distinctive criteria for participation in this context.
Indeed, the basic purpose of guarding against the self-interests of
managers and directors may itself be waylaid if these interconnections
between instrumental and deliberative values remain veiled.
B.

Who Should Vote in Corporate Governance Decisions

Three issues currently appear in debates over who should enjoy
voting rights in corporate governance. The first issue concerns the

priate topics for shareholder attention. Id. New issues, not contemplated at the time of Graham
and Dodd's first edition, also can present conflicts of interest. Notably, the right to vote may
be diluted by a classified board or by dual class capitalization; the right to transfer stock to a
willing buyer at a mutually agreeable price may be abrogated by the adoption of a "poison pill."
With these issues, officers and directors may be interested in protecting themselves, which
could place them at odds with shareholders' interests. These areas would therefore also be
appropriate areas for shareholder input. See infra text accompanying notes 20-27.
18.

For a full summary of state antitakeover laws, see generally S. PAMEPINTO, CAN

STATES STOP CORPORATE TAKEOVERS? 1-51 (1987) (published by the Investor Responsibility

Research Center, Inc.).
19. We explore the "stakeholder" proposals further infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
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allocation of voting rights among shareholders: Should each share count
as one vote, or can a corporation create separate classes of stock to
confine voting rights to some rather than all shares? The second issue
involves the role of institutional investors, such as pension funds: What
principles should guide those entrusted with voting the shares held in
this form? The third issue concerns potential participation by people
other than shareholders: Should people who own no stock have a say
in corporate governance? Resolving each issue requires attention to
the interactions between the instrumental interests of distinct shareholders who use coordination and bargaining efforts to achieve their
own interests and deliberative debate through which broader, communal interests may be articulated and advanced.
In the allocation of voting rights among shareholders, some companies have created dual classes of stock with different voting rights.
The shareholder retains the choice to buy any form of stock, based
on all factors, including the voting rights that accompany the stock.
To eliminate the shareholder's ability to resist takeovers, some companies began to offer exchanges of stock with full voting rights for
stock with limited voted rights - exchanges accompanied by a
"sweetener" such as a cash payment or an extra dividend. These offers
of new stock were reminiscent of the fairy tale-like offers to exchange
Aladdin's old, dusty lamp for a shiny new one - but a new lamp
without a genie to grant wishes, just as the new stock has no vote to
direct the corporation. Whatever their attractions, the new
"sweetened" stocks limited shareholders' voting rights. Opponents of
this development pointed out that these exchanges could well tempt
individual shareholders to sell their votes, especially when the cash
payment or the extra dividend seemed more valuable than an individual vote which by itself could wield no decisive power. 20 But opponents were quick to point out that such exchanges were traps for the
unwary. Those who fell prey to them misunderstood the value of
widespread voting to the group as a whole and ultimately to each
member; only the dispersal of power could provide the needed check
against the self-interest or self-protection of a small group.
In an unprecedented rulemaking action in 1987, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed on all stock exchanges a prohibition on such offers to exchange stock for stock with different voting
lights. 21 The SEC deemed such exchange offers inherently coercive.Y

20. See

INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERV., INC.,

SEC

FILING ON UNBUNDLED

STOCK UNITS pt.1, at 4 (Feb. 3, 1989).

21. 52 Fed. Reg. 26,394 (1988) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(a)).
22. See id. at 26,395 (Comn'r Grundfest, concurring).
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In doing so, the SEC recognized the intertwined nature of individual
and collective interests in the basic rules about shareholder voting;
neither a sole assessment of instrumental individual interests nor a
singular attention to communal deliberation would capture the nature
of the problem.23
The SEC left in place the right of companies to issue stock with
limited voting rights; the only prohibition concerned exchanges for
such stock. Many thoughtful commentators go even further and argue
against dual classes of stock under any circumstances. This view implies an assessment of the vote as an inalienable right precisely because
it establishes relationships that no one person should be able to alter
or waive. 4 In an important analysis, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel argued that the separation of residual claims from voting power
will always create conflicts of interests, or agency costs, which contribute to substantial inefficiencies in corporate oversight.m They found
that the "one share, one vote" rule ensures against the creation of
unnecessary agency costs. 26 By enacting provisions which skew the

voting power of different classes of stock to protect directors and
officers from removal, corporations tend to make themselves self-perpetuating at the expense of shareholders. The long-term consequences
of a system in which managers have ownership interests which diverge
from the general, nonmanager class of owners could devastate efforts
to check managerial decisions.2
The second question about who should vote in corporate governance
concerns the duties of fiduciaries charged with voting the extraordinary number of shares owned by institutional investors. These investors include young workers, retired persons, and persons with varied
economic interests. In addition, their interests may extend beyond
the package of financial risk and return on their investments. Mean-

23. These kinds of problems are defined by economic theorists as "the prisoner's dilemma."
See, e.g., M. TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 92-99 (1987); Plott, RationalChoice
in Experimental Markets, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND
PSYCHOLOGY 117, 124-24 (1987).

24. See, e.g., Tribe, Commentary: The Abortion Funding Conundrum: InalienableRights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 9b HARv. L. REv. 330, 333 n.14 (1985)
(noting that much of the structure of the Constitution, with its separation and divisions of
power, can be viewed as resting on relational norms).
25. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. STUD. 395, 409
(1983).
26. See id.
27.

The difficulty of checking managerial decisions is heightened by proxy voting patterns

which reveal that institutional shareholders give investment managers the authority to vote
their proxies.
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while, the sum of the investments represented by pension funds is
simply enormous. The passage of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Actrs and similar laws governing public pension funds has
created the largest sum of investment capital in the world. These
funds now hold more than two trillion dollars.2
Traditionally, fiduciaries in charge of these large pension funds
were expected to perform under an undivided duty to the interests
of the beneficiaries, and that duty was defined as protecting and enhancing the financial value of the investment. Today, however,
fiduciaries make many investment decisions on grounds unrelated to
or in addition to the traditional goals of minimizing risk and maximizing
return. Often called "social investing," these investment decisions seek
to promote the "quality of life" of participants in the pension plan and
of members of the larger community as well. Divestment from companies that do business in South Africa and other investment decisions
reflect views about the political circumstances in other countries. Some
social investing addresses treatment of employees, environmental concerns, or economic commitments to a particular state of locality. How
should a fiduciary, now, decide how to vote the shares of beneficiaries
who both need guaranteed retirement incomes and want to invest only
in ways that do not have an adverse impact on their jobs, their lives,
or their political or moral beliefs?
ERISA directs that the fiduciary must act "solely in the interests
of the of plan participants," but acknowledges that the participants
themselves are diverse 0 Young workers may want social investing
to ensure their continued employment; older workers and retirees
want to be assured high benefit levels.31 Both interests can be described as instrumental and self-regarding, but when fiduciaries invest
the pooled assets of the fund, efforts to protect young workers and
retirees become expressions of the collective interests, with communal
regard for the interests of others.

28.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1453 (1982) [hereinafter ERISA].

29.

Rock, Decade of the TrillionDollar Owner, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR MIAG. Summer,

1989, at 161.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982).
31. Some plans call for "defined contribution" through which workers put in a specified
amount and receive back whatever returns that amount generates. Under these plans, beneficiaries might well be entitled to make social investing decisions, but logistical difficulties exist
in selecting and presenting choices. See N. Minow, Social Investing: Making the Right Choices,
LEGAL TIMtES, Apr. 24, 1989, at 28. For public pensions, if investment decisions are made for
reasons other than financial return, the pension fund risks losing tax exempt status. Id. at 29.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 9
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

Investment decisions reflecting moral and political concerns present
an even more obvious mix of instrumental and deliberative motives.
Shareholders may prefer not to invest in a company that peddles
defective products for not only moral but also financial reasons. For
example, the president and vice president of Beech-Nut admitted that
they knowingly permitted distribution and sale of adulterated apple
juice destined to be consumed by babies 2 The company pled guilty
to 215 counts of violating federal food and drug laws and paid a $2
million fine.3 It also paid out enormous legal fees, including the fees
for defending the corporate officers'4 In the process, Beech-Nut severely damaged its credibility and appeal to consumers and to
shareholders. The New York Times reported that Beech-Nut's market
share dropped fifteen percent.Thus, what may start out as altruistic concerns by consumers and
shareholders may also reflect hard financial analysis because actions
contrary to the interests of society are also contrary to the interests
of investors. The same is true for a company that violates pollution
laws, procurement requirements, or other norms important enough to
society to be set forth as part of the criminal and civil codes. While
actions that violate the law may yield some short-term benefit, over
the long term society's interest in curtailing such violations of these
36
standards may make such behavior economically detrimental.
At the same time, it would be wrong to reduce social investing
concerns to the bottom line return value. While economists may want
to assimilate a person's desires to avoid investing in a company that
dumps toxic wastes as an expression of that person's individual and
prepolitical preferences, the processes for assessing and expressing
such a desire through an institutional investor demands collective activity and reflects deliberation about what would be good for others.
Voting in the investment context necessarily involves a complex interweaving of individual and collective interests, and by necessity,
fiduciaries must develop ways to assess the financial and nonfinancial
interests of the beneficiaries. Although the fiduciary structure adds
another layer between the beneficiary and the corporate decisionmak-

32. Traub, Into the Mouths of Babes, New York Times, July 24, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at
18, col.1.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. This assumes that relevant governmental bodies will adequately enforce the laws and
that civil litigants will have meaningful access to courts, which may not always be the case.
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ing process, it may secure the closest private sector equivalent to the
Greek ideal of citizenship in the form of voters - the fiduciaries who fully devote themselves to the process of participation in governance and serve with an obligation to become involved3 7 Thus, not
surprisingly, institutional investors have begun to identify the process
of corporate governance as a focus for reform.
The third question surrounding shareholder voting and corporate
governance involves what role, if any, should be played by people
who are neither officers of the corporation nor shareholders. On one
hand, outside involvement might fulfill the goal of accountability and
guard against the self-interest of delegated authorities by dispersing
interests in governance across a broader group than the shareholders
and officers. The assessment of interests beyond those of the owners
and managers could focus attention on external interests that otherwise may be only indirectly considered in corporate decisionmaking.
In recent years, some officers have advocated "stakeholder" provisions in state statutes and corporate charters 9 These provisions would

37. The interesting question is not why institutions have become active in voting proxies,
but why it has taken so long. The proxy voting system, designed to promote privacy and
liquidity, is virtually dysfunctional for corporate governance. One problem is the Byzantine structure of the system itself. Roughly 70% of all corporate stock is not held in "stree name" (the name
of the bank or broker), at a regional depository, serving as custodian. If the investor does not
want its name released to the company whose shares it holds, as is true of many large institutional
shareholders, the name remains confidential. Such confidentiality makes it very difficult for
shareholders to identify, much less contact, the other shareholders. The Independent Election
Corporation of America, which acts as an intermediary between an issuer company and the
clients of more than 1500 banks and brokers, is essentially an unregulated monopoly, subject
to neither market nor government controls. B. KRIKORLAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS IN PENSION AND TRUST MALNAGEMENT 200-01 (1989); H. SHERMAN & J. HEARD, CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM 83-84 (1987).
38. In 1989, two public pension funds joined with a large individual shareholder to mount
a successful full-scale proxy fight over a corporate governance issue at Honeywell, Inc. Pension
Funds Join Private Holders to Snatch Last Minute Victory from Honeywell Board, 6 CORP.
CONTROL ALERT, June 1989, at 1. The issue was not control of the company as no one contested
seats on the board. Instead, the shareholders challenged one management proposal that would
put up only one-third of the directors for reelection each year and another management proposal
that would eliminate the right of the shareholders to act by written consent (thereby eliminating
the chance for shareholder action outside of the annual meeting). Smith, Kilman & White,
Honeywell, Inc.'s Anti-Takeover Moves Defeated, Wall St. J., May 15, 1989, § 1, at 3. The
shareholders successfully prevented management from reducing their accountability and defeated
these proposals. See generally INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS SERVICES, INC., THE 1989
HONEYWELL SOLICITATION (1989). This active shareholder involvement, along with some
takeover rumors, was credited with enhancing the value of the stock; the marketplace recognized
the value of large institutional shareholders holding management accountable. Id. Thus, activism
became one of the soundest investments of the season.
39. Letter from Georgia Pacific to Shareholders 15 (Mar. 23, 1989) (recommending addition
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permit the board of directors to consider the impact of proposed action
on its employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and communities or
in light of any other factors it deems pertinent. 40 Accordingly, shareholders' interests would be but one important interest among many
sets of interests the board could cite in justifying its actions. If the
impact of corporate decisions is as widespread as we suggested earlier,41 it makes sense for companies to acknowledge and accept responsibility for this impact.4 Accepting responsibility for a decision's impact
could involve viewing employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and
neighbors as constituencies for the corporation along with the shareholders and officers. Acknowledging these varied interests and coming
to grips with the conflicts and potential resolutions among them
process that Professor Michelman
epitomizes the kind of deliberative
43
has so vividly described.

Yet, management often supports "stakeholder" language not to
achieve this vision of deliberative politics but to camouflage neglect,
whether intentional or unintentional, of the rights of shareholders.
Permission for managers to consider the impact of proposed actions
on varied constituencies is not, after all, a requirement to include
those constituencies in the decisionmaking process. Instead it enlarges
management's prerogatives and insulates management from the
checking power of shareholders who otherwise could guard against
management's self-dealing. Analysis of stakeholder proposals requires
detailed information about the particular process and context. Generally, however, this ostensible effort to enhance corporate concern for
broader communities may instead serve to augment the power of the
managerial minority. Like so many of the dimensions of corporate
governance and shareholder participation, assessment of stakeholder
provisions demands a nuanced understanding of the interconnections
between self-interest and other-regarding behavior - between
strategic instrumentalism and communal deliberation.

to the Articles of Incorporation requiring directors to consider effects of any action on the
corporation and its shareholders, along with the interests of employees, customers, and creditors);
Letter from Knight-Ridder, Inc. to Knight-Ridder Shareholders (Mar. 6, 1989) (featuring shareholder proposal that compels consideration of integrity concerns in corporate decisionmaking);
Letter from the Citizens and Southern Corporation to Shareholders 13 (Mar. 3, 1989) (also
proposing that board consider effects on interests of shareholders, employees, customers, etc.).
40. Id.
41. See supra text accompanying note 12.
42. See Drucker, Corporate Takeovers - What is to be Done?, 82 THE PUBLIC INTEREST
822 (Winter 1986) (calling for attention to groups other than shareholders that may be injured
by hostile takeovers).
48. See Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 2, at 443.
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III.

WOMEN AND VOTING

The political battle over women's suffrage provides another setting
showing inextricable connections between instrumental and deliberative conceptions of voting. In both the variety of reasons why women
sought the vote and in the range of arguments for enfranchisement
they offered in public debate, the advocates for women's suffrage
intertwined theoretical conceptions of universal, prepolitical rights
with notions of individual self-interest to be pursued practically
through the vote. The conventional wisdom holds that the victory of
women's enfranchisement actually produced no noticeable difference
in political processes or results. Yet, as they secured the vote for
women, the suffragists also helped to strengthen a more general understanding of the vote as a basic right rather than a privilege.
Moreover, the continuing presence of distinctive arguments about
group identity generated in the struggle for supports offers conceptions
of politics that complement and perhaps overtake the instrumental
and deliberative ideals.
A.

Why Women Wanted the Vote and How They Argued for It

The movement for women's suffrage, according to historians, reflected aspirations for radical change in women's lives. 44 Suffragists
wanted to lessen women's burdens at home and their exclusion from
public governance. Some suffragists espoused an ideal of prepolitical,
natural rights along the same lines of argument used to justify voting
by men. Accordingly, the vote represented an inalienable right to
participate in the governance of oneself and one's society, a right
standing outside of any given political moment - even though the
vote had rarely been implemented for women. This right would recognize equality of women and free them from dependency. Thus, in its
very conception, this ideal departed from another argument advanced
by "domestic" reformers, who sought to elevate women's status as
wives and mothers in exchange for women's loss of economic power,
as production moved from home to factory. 45 Some suffragists built
on this tradition of domestic ideals and explicitly advocated voting
rights in the name of women as wives and mothers who would bring

44. See, e.g., E. DuBois, FEMINISM AND
PENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA

SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDE1848-1869 (1978).

45. Id. at 16; see also Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights that Belong
to Us All", 74 J. Am. HIST. 1018-20 (1987).
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different values to the public sphere. 46 The argument
drew on a notion
47
of women's nature rather than natural rights.
To what extent were the advocates appealing to an idea of politics
as an arena for instrumental action and the pursuit of individual self-interest? To what extent were they instead adverting to an image of politics as a setting for deliberation through which people would persuade,
and even transform, one another? The answer is unavoidably a mixture
of both, and sorting out the conceptions may be not only impossible,
but also misleading. After all, an argument that women's values and
experiences as mothers afford them an expertise needed in the public
sphere combines as two sides of the same coin the goals of acquiring
power and improving society.
Similarly, when working class women became involved in the movement for suffrage after the turn of the century, they often couched
their advocacy in terms of self-interest: they claimed that only by
having the vote could they secure laws assuring them safe working
conditions, reasonable working hours, healthy food, and pay equal to
men performing the same jobs. 43 Yet, intermixed with these claims

were arguments challenging the conceptions of womanhood advanced
not only by opponents to women's suffrage, but also by the
mainstream, middle-class suffragists. These working-class women
thereby used the very occasion of advocating for an increase in their
own political effectiveness as an opportunity to persuade others about
how to conceive of gender and class relations in the society.
Working class leaders thus pointed out the contradictions between
social ideas about women and the reality of working class women.
They argued for a conception of women's lives that integrated paid
work and family roles. 49 One spokeswoman challenged the arguments
46. See A. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890-1920,
at 56-72 (1965). Some of the contrast between arguments for women's suffrage may be attributable to different phases within a nearly 70-year political process, but contrasting arguments
often appeared at the same time; see id. (arguing that the movement became more conservative
over time and defining the cause in terms of women's moral nature and defense of the traditional
family and its needs). See also N. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM: THE
WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 224-25 (1975).

47. As the text that follows explores, it is difficult to map these arguments onto Michelman's
distinction between strategic and deliberative conceptions of politics, although they do neatly
divide along the lines of liberalism (pre-political, fundamental rights) and republicanism (virtuous
participation reflecting one's role in a hierarchical, organic society).
48. See, e.g., S. EISENSTEIN, GIVE US BREAD BUT GIVE US ROSES: WORKING WOMEN'S
CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890 TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR 155-60 (1983)

(statement of Leonora O'Reilly to congressional comnnittees, Mar. 1912, Suffrage Leaflet,
speeches of Rose Schneiderman and Clara Lemlich).
49. Id. at 144, 149.
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of opponents of women's suffrage who feared that women's political
power would assure equal pay and thus undermine women's incentives
to marry by noting, "if long hours and starvation wages are the only
weapons or encouragement men can use to induce marriage, it is a
very poor compliment to them, and in the name of a purer marriage
we must have equal say as we have found from experience that men
cannot get married alone."'5' Yet another spokeswoman criticized middle-class proponents of suffrage who deprecated the marriage and
family hopes of working-class women.6 1 In these ways, the working
class advocates of women's suffrage used the debate over enfranchisement as a chance to articulate aspirations of a group largely unknown
to other women and men.
Most notorious among contemporary observers of the movement
for women's suffrage is the set of arguments advanced by some white
middle-class suffragists that exploited public prejudices against blacks
and immigrants. Although many of the first advocates for women's
rights were themselves active abolitionists before the Civil War, some
white women voice their humiliation at being ruled by former slaves.52
As Aileen Kraditor explored in her classic study of women's suffrage,53
some white women felt that they had to choose between winning the
vote for women and winning the vote for Negroes, an argument that
ignored, as arguments still commonly do, the entire category of Negro
women. Thus, some members of the suffrage movement opposed the
fourteenth amendment because, while it ushered in an era of voting
for black men, it inserted the word "male" in the definition of protected
voters and thus created a new hurdle to women's suffrage. 4 Others
expressly argued for women's suffrage by noting that white women's
votes could help form a bloc against any measures threatening the
supremacy of whites.r'
Similar arguments advocated votes for women to counter the votes
extended to male immigrants. A major leader of the suffrage movement at the turn of the century described one of the obstacles to
women's suffrage as the desire to halt the extensions of democracy

50. Id. at 22 (quoting Mollie Schepps).
51. Id. at 144 (quoting Rose Schneiderman).
52. A. KRADITOR, supra note 46, at 125, 166-85, 197-205.
53. See generally id.
54. Id. Similarly, some leading feminists later opposed the fifteenth amendment for excluding women, while others supported it and used the occasion to urge enfranchisement of women,
including Negro women. See E. DuBoIs, supra note 44, at 163-89.
55. See Kraditor, supra note 46, at 182, 188-98.
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"following the aggressive movements that, with possible ill-advised
haste, enfranchised the foreigner, the [N]egro and the Indian. Perilous
conditions, seeming to follow from the introduction into the body politic
of vast numbers of irresponsible citizens, have made the nation
timid. ' '56 Arguments for literacy and education as prerequisites for
suffrage neatly served the interests expressed here, while undercutting the claims that voting is a natural right and civil duty. 57 As Rogers
Smith recently demonstrated, advocates for expansions of suffrage
critically combined appeals to liberal faith in human rights and republican ideals of "civic humanism" and "American nativism."' The
nativist strand emphasized the social, religious, and ethnic features
of the true American way of life, and served as a timely deprecation
of recent immigrants, freed slaves, and other minority groups.
What conception of politics animated these arguments? Instrumental uses of the public sphere to advance the interests of one's own
group certainly permeated the arguments of various groups of suffragists. At the same time, suffragists invoked both the language of
liberal prepolitical rights and republican virtue. They demanded inclusion of some while urging exclusions of others. Perhaps such arguments
reflected strategic concerns, but the racist and xenophobic appeals
probably also manifested deeply held conceptions of the kind of people
they believed entitled to govern and capable of governing.
B.

Conceptions of Politics

Most historians concur that women's suffrage, once secured, made
little difference in American politics. 59 One exception, however, is the
brief experiment of congressional support for maternal and infant
health that in many ways presaged the programs of public assistance
and health support established during the New Deal and since. 60
Yet another lasting legacy of the achievement of women's suffrage
is the set of arguments generated by the advocates - a legacy with
both positive and negative effects. One argument that endures is the

56. Id. at 197 (quoting Carrie Chipman Catt).
57. Id. at 124-25, 137.
58. Smith, "One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest
for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 229 (1989).
59. See, e.g. C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 460-61 (1980); W. O'NEILL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE: THE

RISE AND FALL OF FEMINISM 276-90 (1969).
60. See J. LEMONS, THE WOMAN CITIZEN: SOCIAL FEMINISM IN THE 1920S, at 153
(1973); Dye & Breckinridge, The FrontierNursing Service, and the Introduction of Nurse-Miduifery in the United States, in WOMEN AND HEALTH IN AMERICA 327 (J. Leavitt ed. 1984).
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claim that women offer something to politics not because they are the
same as men, but because they are different. The claim is that women
'bring the perspectives enabled or conditioned by their roles as wives
and mothers. Commentators can debate whether such "caretaking"
perspectives actually match up with people who are biologically
women 1 Observers also can, and do, debate whether the results of
"caretaking" arguments in politics are progressive or conservative.6
Beyond debate is the persistent presence in political argument of
claims based on neither individual preference nor universal rights, but
instead on the perspective of a class of people. Not only do these
themes transform the premises about women's roles and usher in a
place for women in public life, they also transform the topics and
strategies available for everyone in public political discourse.6
At the same time, the very content of claims about "women's
perspective" during the suffrage movement betrayed the self-preoccupation of the white, middle-class women who dominated the activists.
Theirs could have been called the movement for white, Anglo-Saxon,
middle-class women's suffrage. For even if they had not explicitly
campaigned on racist and xenophobic grounds, their conception of
womanly virtues and motherly skills reflected an ideal forged with
their own class, race, and ethnic identities in mind.6 The heterogeneity
of women is one of the many reasons why women have not distinguished themselves in politics as a distinctive voting bloc. Yet, the
response to repeated demonstrations of this heterogeneity has not
been the elimination of arguments about political participation premised on group identity. The notion of group identity has instead
become more complicated and varied. Many different groups, with
contrasting and even conflicting viewpoints, campaign on specific policy
issues in the name of women.rl Arguments for the inclusion of black
61. Cf. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1745 (1989)
(demanding evidence for the idea that minority scholars by virtue of their racial identity alone
have a different perspective from white scholars).
62. M. KATZENSTEIN & D. LAITIN, Politics Feminism, andthe Ethic of Caring,in WOMEN
AND MORAL THEORY 261 (D. Meyers & E. Kittay eds. 1987).
63. See generally J. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (1981). This does not mean that all boundaries between public and
private realms do, or should, dissolve. See Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J.
1713 (1988).
64.

See generally E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN

FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988) (exploring hidden and yet persistent biases of privilege in feminist
theory).
65.

See, e.g., J. LEMONS, supra note 60, at 172-73 (discussing Daughters of the American

Revolution and Woman Patriots who opposed renewal of the Sheppard-Towner Act which had
been drafted and advocated by other women's groups); K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLI-

TICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984) (comparing pro-life and pro-choice women activists).
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women, Hispanic women, women with disabilities, and indeed, men
who belong to such subgroups are now the mainstay of political negotiations. Multiple feminisms - with commitments to contrasting goals
and strategies - characterize modern political debates.6
The continued use of group identities carries the promise of valorization and the danger of stigma. By claiming membership in an historically excluded group to secure inclusion, an individual may obtain
inclusion but also may refuel arguments for negative and differential
treatment. 7 Perhaps hope for relief from this conundrum can be fostered by the proliferation and growing complexity of group identities,
but their relief will come as people join in accepting identity-based
politics rather than rejecting it. 6s
The campaign for women's suffrage thus bequeathed a structure
of political argument that emphasizes the group membership of a participant as a positive element and also as a potentially divisive element
that also risks renewed subordination along the lines of group differences. Identities forged outside the political settings - and also reconstituted in them - have become a fixture of political life and argument.
Both instrumental and deliberative features of political argument converge in identity politics as individuals claim group identities and
persuade one another about how and when these identities matter.
Yet, perhaps more telling than the distinction between instrumental
and deliberative politics here, as in the context of shareholder voting,
is their interdependence.
IV.

SHOPPING FOR POLITICS

As Frank Michelman so astutely demonstrates, arguments about
who can vote and on what matters have drawn on criteria much deeper
than those of interest, residence, and competence. 69 In the private

66. N. CoTr, supra note 46, at 282-83. Cott notes the arrival of plural feminisms in the
transition from 19th century talk of 'the woman movement" to the 20th century labels of
"women's rights" and "women's liberation." Id. See generally FEMINIST THEORY IN PRACTICE
AND PROCESS (1989) (collection of essays rejecting a single feminist theory and embracing
multiplicity as an organizing framework).
67. See M. Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
68. See Young, Politics and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideology of Universal
Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250 (1989). Another hope for breaking out of the dilemma posed by
claiming group identity appears in efforts to distinguish group identities assigned by others
from group identities accepted or reclaimed by the individual. Even then, group labels risk
subjecting people to discrimination and stigma. See Epstein, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of
Social Construction, SOCIALIST REV., May-Aug. 1987, at 9, 19.
69. See Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 2, at 453-90.
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context of corporate governance, arguments about who can vote draw
on fundamental rights (connected with ownership), special competencies or abilities (in holding officers accountable), and benefits to the
community (again, accountability). In the public context of general
political voting rights, arguments for women's suffrage also have
drawn on fundamental rights (universal rights of "men"), special competencies or abilities (the caretaking skills and interests of wives and
mothers), and benefits to the community (again, the virtues of women's
perspectives). The convergence between the arguments in these strikingly different contexts is itself notable.
In addition, in both contexts the arguments intriguingly cross
familiar boundaries between public and private spheres. Experts in
shareholder voting craft analogies to representative democracy: proponents of women's suffrage mold conceptions of women's private roles.
In each setting, the arguments about voting reveal and simultaneously
help constitute conceptions of politics as the realm for debating relationships between public and private, individual and community, rights
and interests, needs and abilities. Ultimately, the debates over who
may vote form predicates for collective efforts to resolve differences.70
Republicanizing the reasons for franchise can itself strengthen the
fundamental tasks of politics.

70. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the great 19th century advocate for women's rights, fought
hard for the vote but also maintained the importance of devising programs for reform after
enfranchisement. "[Ilt is puerile to say 'no matter how we use the ballot the right is ours."' E.
CADY STANTON & S. ANTHONY, CORRESPONDENCE, WRITING, SPEECHES 182 (E. DuBois
ed. 1981).
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